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Abstract
This article conceptualizes strategic communication nationalism amid the coronavirus 
pandemic. Specifically, this research explores traditional strategic use of communication 
such as nationalism, propaganda, PSYOP, and dissent public relations in an epistemic 
status, as well as new strategic use of communication such as rhetorical reappropriation, 
use of social media, and control of narratives toward global audiences. The focus is on the 
U.S. challenges emerging from the Chinese coronavirus propaganda campaign, which 
spreads disinformation to deflect blame for the outbreak via a spinning-a-tale narrative. 
This article relies on President Trump’s dissent strategic communication technique 
against the Chinese coronavirus propaganda campaign via Twitter, including his 
rhetorical reappropriation of the Chinese virus to lay the foundation for developing a S.C. 
nationalism model in the COVID-19 era. The role President Trump plays in reaffirming the 
origin of the COVID pandemic is characterized as advocacy for nationalism, not racism, 
in a process of developing S.C. nationalism, visualized in this article.   
Keywords: strategic communication war, nationalism, coronavirus, advocacy, propaganda, 
PSYOP, Trump, Chinese virus, CCP
On March 27, 2020, a Federal Bureau Investigation (FBI) document, obtained by ABC 
News, warned of an increase in hate crimes against Asians living in the United States as the 
coronavirus crisis continued to expand.
The FBI assesses hate crime incidents against Asian Americans likely will surge 
across the United States, due to the spread of coronavirus disease … endangering 
Asian American communities, based on the assumption that a portion of the US public 
will associate COVID-19 with China and Asian American populations. (Margolin, 
2020, para. 2)
The FBI caveat originated from the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), officially recognized 
as a pandemic by the World Health Organization on March 11, 2020. The ongoing pandemic killed 
over 22,000 U.S. citizens with over 555,000 tested positive cases by April 12, 2020, Easter Sunday, 
and hit the number of 100,000 deaths on May 28 (Hernandez et al., 2020). It has globally devastated 
basic human livelihood with the high rates of mortality, unemployment, food insecurity, and 
physical and mental health instability around 185 countries and territories. Simply put, the world 
was dealing with the worst kind of global disaster since World War II, according to UN Secretary-
General Antonio Guterres (Usher, 2020). 
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While the coronavirus pandemic was being viewed as the biggest challenge and disaster 
for the world, there are many ideas of how the virus started and where it came from. However, this 
article – regardless of a wide range of conspiracy theories, allegations, or scientific facts about the 
origin of the virus – focuses on the call for the rethinking of strategic communication functions 
as a specific advocacy form of nationalism, embodied in safeguarding sovereignty and national 
security. U.S. advocacy of nationalism from the perspective of public diplomacy reflected lessons 
from historical foreign policy events such as the Vietnam War and the 9/11 attacks.  Those examples 
prompted the administration’s decision to protect U.S. citizens and its national sovereignty 
(Hemmer, 2007).  It is worth noting that the term “strategic communication” (S.C.) carries holistic 
but nebulous meanings of propagandistic diplomacy since it gained the terminological popularity 
after the 9/11 attacks under the George W. Bush administration (Halloran, 2007). The concept of 
strategic communication has evolved into an integrated practice of propagandistic diplomacy and 
public relations for government (Lim, 2015). 
This article explores the intertwined relations of strategic communication, public relations, 
and diplomacy from a propagandistic perspective, aiming to present a new strategic communication 
model derived from the theoretical concept of nationalism. Armstrong (2009) argued that public 
diplomacy sits comfortably as a specialization of public relations in terms of pursuing political 
or social objectives as a promotional device or publicity skill. The connection between public 
diplomacy and public relations is considered critical to public and global support for government 
because of some functional overlaps of advocacy, negotiation, and advisory (Fitzpatrick et al., 2013). 
More recently, since the role of activism for sovereignty as one of the major disciplines of public 
relations emerged, research has shown that the concepts of dissent public relations is associated 
with advocacy for a protective mechanism for sovereign nations (Bisbe, Molner, & Jiménez, 2019; 
Heath & Xifra, 2016). Dissent public relations regarded as a form of persuasive communication 
seeks to bring attention to “new thinking, new behavior in areas of national life by promoting ideas 
for change and for retention” in the political economy of civil society (Moloney et al., 2013, p. 3). If 
applied, dissent public relations’ technique can be used for a sovereign nation to lay the foundation 
for a call for a new paradigm of behavioral and mental change in human preservation of the global 
community. 
The coronavirus pandemic ignited a Chinese government-driven campaign discrediting 
the Wuhan origin of the disease outbreak. In the meantime, the Chinese government attempted 
to reshape the narrative about the virus as a U.S. army-originated pandemic. In response, U.S. 
President Donald Trump fired back and called it the “Chinese virus” after the U.S. State Department 
had summoned Chinese Ambassador to the U.S. Cui Tiankai to dissent from the Chinese conspiracy 
theory that the U.S. Army might have brought the pandemic to Wuhan, China (Pickrell, 2020). 
Regardless of the etymological names of the coronavirus, COVID-19 or the Chinese virus, the 
Chinese government’ strategic communication campaign for extrication of the global blame from the 
pandemic origin embraces such intertwined elements of public diplomacy, nationalism, sovereignty, 
crisis management, and propaganda from the integral standpoint of strategic communication and 
public relations. In this respect, a fresh strategic communication concept should be designed to lay 
the groundwork for a global paradigm of national advocacy: Strategic communication nationalism 
or S.C. nationalism. This article delves into the path of how S.C. nationalism is conceptualized, 
established, and implemented in the context of national sovereignty.
Coronavirus as Uncharted Territory for Government 
There are several uncertain speculations of the origin and the cause of the coronavirus. 
Two popular ones were either a synthesized bioweapon mistakenly leaked from a research facility 
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or an animal-transmitted disease from a wet market in China. A public notice of the virus emerged 
in the city of Wuhan, Hubei province of China, late December 2019, with the assumption about 
something sold at a wet market or a seafood market of the city, including bats and pangolins, which 
might pass the virus to humans. However, it is reported that the first coronavirus patient, a 55-year-
old individual from Hubei province in China, was documented by the Chinese government on 
November 17, 2019 (Ma, 2020). Although doctors and scientists are struggling to trace the virus 
back to where it originated and how it spread, it is worth noting that “China alerted the World Health 
Organization (WHO) to cases of unusual pneumonia in Wuhan on December 31” and the WHO 
declared the outbreak, which originated in China, “a pandemic” (“Coronavirus: All You Need to 
Know,” 2020, pp. 1-14). Since the pandemic’s aftermath was unprecedent to the global economy 
and health, human beings confronted challenging times harsher than the Great Depression of the 
1930s and the Spanish flu pandemic of the 1910s. 
The coronavirus pandemic radically accelerated the process toward reforming human 
livelihood.  Changes included digital lifestyle, telemedicine, virtual reality, science dominance, less 
individualism, bigger government, stronger patriotism, and fervent nationalism. The pandemic led 
most nations to shut down their borders, discouraging imports and exports of goods in the era of 
globalization. Rather than providing more assistance for poor or heavily hit nations by the pandemic, 
each nation transformed its governmental operation into self-survival. The public expected their 
government to do more for their individual safety and financial security. This phenomenon enhanced 
the procedure of reorienting individual relationship to government and to the outside world. The 
public was willing to sacrifice their privacy in exchange for public protection, in which government 
acquires the public consent to play an authoritarian role. While nations stayed closed, the roles of 
government as an active force in guiding social regulations and economic development remained 
vital both in the free-market economy of the United States and the unitary one-party socialist country 
of China.
Strategic Communication
Many fields of studies are using the term “strategic communication” as conceptual 
guidance to explain their practices.  Strategic communication (S.C.) can be defined as “using 
corporate or institutional communications to create, strengthen or preserve, among key audiences, 
opinion favourable to the attainment of institutional/corporate goals” (NKA Public Affairs, 2020, 
para. 1).  Paul (2011) notes that S.C. is a process “guided by the relentless pursuit of answers to 
deceptively simple questions. What do you want to accomplish? Who has to think or act differently 
for that to happen? What would prompt them to do it?” (p. 23).  Okigbo (2014) views S.C. as an 
evidence-based, results-oriented process, undertaken in consultation with the participant group(s). 
It is intrinsically linked to other programme elements, cognisant of the local context and favouring 
a multiplicity of communication approaches, to stimulate positive and measurable behaviour and 
social change. (p. 26)
 As such definitions show, the conceptual term “strategic communication” is used with 
self-interpreted understandings of those definitions in a broad range of contexts from corporations, 
nongovernmental organizations, and private institutions. In particular, this article stems from 
Pamment’s guidance of strategic communication, which claims that strategic communication is 
aimed to implement “proactive communications activities and campaigns, including political 
advocacy and initiatives in public and cultural diplomacy” for particular regions (2020, p. 7). 
According to Pamment, strategic communication with evidence-based communications and policies 
focuses on addressing “disinformation and foreign manipulative interference in the information 
space through the task forces” (2020, p.7). 
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Incorporation of Strategic Communication in Diplomacy and PSYOP
In cases of strategic communication of the U.S. government, Lim (2015) pointed out that 
such maneuvers of fixing disinformation or fighting propagandistic messages designed to attack 
the United States by foreign government are officially operated by the two paramount departments 
in charge of maintaining national security: the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department 
of State (DOS). DOD’s psychological operations (PSYOP) and DOS’s public diplomacy are 
interchangeably used with the term “strategic communication” to share the same meaning to 
carry the connotation: “Using neither physical nor hard power to engage people abroad in favor 
of the U.S. government policies and interests” (Lim, 2015, p. 4). One interesting fact about the 
operations is that the White House, the highest hierarchical organization, had been reticent about 
“how President directs the use of strategic communication to his cabinet members as Commander 
in Chief or Chief Executive Officer” (p. 4), until President Donald Trump who changed the White 
House tradition of using strategic communication with his direct engagement to refute foreign 
governments’ disinformation and propagandistic messages. Hence, this article argues that Trump’s 
direct engagement in strategic communication should be analyzed with a new theoretical model 
that incorporates diplomacy, propaganda, PSYOP, and nationalism into the practice of strategic 
communication.     
Situational Coronavirus Crisis Management by Chinese Government  
Benoit (1997) and Coombs (2007) suggested nine crisis communication strategies, 
depending on situations, later conceptualized as the situational crisis communication theory. 
When an organization or a nation is under attack or in a crisis phase the theory offers possible 
communication solutions to be implemented such as (1) excuse, (2) justification, (3) reminder, (4) 
ingratiation, (5) compensation, (6) apology, (7) attack the accuser, (8) denial, and (9) scapegoat. Of 
the nine organizational responses of crisis communication the Chinese government adopted and 
applied the last three crisis responses to fend off or distract the global blame for the pandemic.  
Lijian Zhao, the spokesperson of the Chinese foreign ministry and face of the Chinese 
Communist Party tweeted in English on March 12, 2020, indicating that the United States was 
behind the coronavirus outbreak in China: “CDC was caught on the spot. When did patient zero 
begin in U.S.? How many people are infected? What are the names of the hospitals? It might be U.S. 
army who brought the epidemic to Wuhan. Be transparent! Make public your data! U.S. owe us an 
explanation!” (Zhao, 2020). In another tweet on the same day, Zhao also linked an article claiming that 
the coronavirus originated from the United States (Zhao, 2020). The two tweets by a Chinese high-
ranking government official are viewed as a public relations spinning-a-tale technique in a crisis phase 
that raised a conspiracy theory about the origin of the coronavirus. The technique integrates the three 
tactics of “attack the accuser, denial, and scapegoat” into rewriting a narrative paradigm of conspiracy 
theories. In particular, the three tactics by Benoit (1997) and Coombs (2007) are defined as follows: 
     
(1) Attack the accuser: crisis manager fires back at the person or group claiming 
something is wrong with the organization. 
(2) Denial: crisis manager asserts that there no longer exists a crisis inside the 
organization. 
(3) Scapegoat: crisis manager accuses some person or group outside of the 
organization of the origin of crisis.
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The tweets by the spokesperson of the Chinese foreign ministry were timely orchestrated 
right after officials from China’s National Health Commission declared the country had no new 
locally transmitted coronavirus cases (Westcott & Wang, 2020). In other words, China declared that 
there was no coronavirus crisis in the nation (denial), but other nations, especially the United States, 
was the most coronavirus-populated epicenter for the global pandemic (attack the accuser), and the 
U.S. army was to blame for the contagion (scapegoat). The Chinese public relations spinning-a-tale 
technique with the three tactics of crisis response communication is an old maneuver of circulating 
disinformation, which can be regarded as a foil of Communist propaganda applications. Amid the 
global pandemic the tweeted Chinese theory of new origin of the coronavirus succeeded in catching 
all major U.S. media attention and being reported or covered in their news outlets, including 
newspapers such as the New York Times, the Washington Post, and television news channels such 
as CNN, MSNBC, CBS News, and Fox News. From the standpoint of the Chinese government, an 
ethical matter of disseminating fabricated ideas of propagandistic theories would not be problematic. 
Rather, it would be a matter of restoring its top leaders’ authority and maintaining the Communist 
Party’s power over 1.4 billion Chinese citizens. By spinning a tale of blame on the United States and 
American soldiers, the Chinese government aimed to deflect Chinese citizens’ resentment toward 
President Xi’s initial mishandling of the outbreak. The tweets by spokesperson Zhao represents 
the government-driven propaganda campaign by using the spinning-a-tale technique of narrative 
paradigm, including the dissemination of propagandistic disinformation.  
Propagandistic Disinformation in PSYOP 
According to Voice of America, disinformation is defined as deliberately misleading or 
biased information in a manipulative form of propagandistic narrative (2018). It involves the spread 
of false information to mislead a target audience in hopes of convincing them to deny reality, or not 
credit something other people know is true. The practice of disinformation goes back to Communist 
propaganda, based on the history of the Soviet Union. Communist propaganda is divided into three 
types, or forms, depending on whether the source’s intention is either known or unknown (Garner, 
2010): (1) Black propaganda is conducted with fabricated information and deceptive source identity 
to deliberately deceive a target audience; (2) White propaganda can relate to modern public relations 
techniques with an identified source and the factual one-sided information; and (3) Grey propaganda 
comes from an uncertain or anonymous source, being placed somewhere in the middle. Cull et al. 
(2017) pointed out that the Soviet Union used media outlets, sourced by black and grey propaganda, 
to derail the anti-Soviet resistance during the Cold War.
Why did the Chinese government launch the coronavirus propaganda campaign to derail 
the facts about the origin of the virus, although there has been plenty of evidence showing that 
the coronavirus originated from either one of the wet markets in the city of Wuhan or the Wuhan 
Institute of Virology (WIV), a biosecurity lab? The answer can be found in the effectiveness of 
propaganda with the aid of strategic psychological operations (PSYOP), aimed for psychological 
manipulation. Ni (2015) explained that psychological manipulation, as opposed to healthy social 
influence, serves as a propaganda tactic to seize power, control, benefits and/or privileges at the 
victim’s expense through mental distortion. PSYOP takes huge advantage of the manipulative tactic 
since it is simply described as “the use of public relations” to change target audiences’ opinions or 
beliefs in a time of crisis or war (Schleifer, 2014, p.153). 
In a broader definition with two levels of PSYOP is commonly activated when “the 
relationships between the state and the rest of the world” confront trouble (Schleifer,2014, p. 154). 
The troubled state utilizes the strategic level of PSYOP to promote a positive image for the state, 
to deter enemies, and to encourage supporters. On the operative level, PSYOP aims to reconstruct 
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the faith or belief of target citizens, so the state can improve the conditions for the internal political 
struggle after the crisis ends. Schleifer’s analysis of PSYOP demonstrates the intention of the 
Chinese government’s provocative propaganda initiation about the origin of the coronavirus. The 
government launched a PSYOP campaign toward domestic and global citizens to manipulate 
their opinions and beliefs, ensuring that the origin of the global pandemic was from outside the 
nation in dissociation of Chinese people who were also supposedly seen as victims of the disease. 
        The prime principle of PSYOP results in the following steps of repetition, manipulation, 
and conviction of illusive truth. Repetition of the same message, often-applied strategy in political 
campaigns, is designed to increase the persuasive impact. The target audience is more likely to 
believe the message as true if they hear it multiple times (Ernst et al., 2017). In fact, previous 
research found that the repeated presentation of manipulative messages increases credibility and 
attitude change (Fernandes, 2013; Sheff, 2010). The Chinese government’s PSYOP of a conspiracy 
theory linking the U.S. army to the coronavirus embraced the practice of message repetition, 
operated by Chinese officials and the government-owned media. Metzger et al. (2003) identified 
four message elements to make a manipulative message effective and credible: message structure, 
message content, message delivery, and presentation style. The Chinese government made a simple 
but compelling message structure of condemning the U.S. army, while the message content was 
clearly written in plain English and delivered via Twitter in a form of official statement. Such a short 
but tremendously orchestrated message via Twitter attracted heavy attention and responses from 
the U.S. government and the media, meaning that the Chinese government’s first step of PSYOP 
succeeded in increasing the frequency of exposure to the American people and the global public. It 
was perfect timing for the Chinese government to launch the propaganda campaign during the U.S. 
skyrocketing numbers of coronavirus patients and deaths. The cycle of manipulation of PSYOP 
begins with the discovery of victim’s weakness and ends with taking advantage of the victim’s 
damaged status quo (Collins, 1999). 
 Propagandistic techniques of repetition and manipulation lead to re-defined identity of the 
message creator. Being under global accusations of the origin country of the coronavirus, the Chinese 
government supposedly as a credible source attempted to extract the spinning-a-tale technique of 
narrative paradigm. A crucial point of the technique is that human beings tend to continue to believe 
someone, even when they have rational and substantial evidence that they are being deceived (Barth, 
2019). Barth posits people believe lies when they feel “too vulnerable to allow the truth” (2019, 
para. 14). The Chinese government found the right frightened psyche timing of propagandizing the 
message to the U.S. and global publics to reshape the narrative of the origin of the pandemic while 
the U.S. and other nations were struggling with the increasing number of coronavirus infections. 
         Blaming the victim for causing their own victimization is not an uncommon technique of 
propaganda. While the U.S. was dealing with national weaknesses of health systems, revealing 
the vulnerability of public health against such a novel virus, the Chinese government spread the 
orchestrated message, which in the beginning might be something seemingly provocative and even 
egregious. However, one little message can be accepted by an individual and another one, and such 
individuals can turn into a group of believers who become supporters of the message creator (Barth, 
2019). Such a communication process can be understood as a form of a spinning-a-tale event between 
the narrator and the listener. The Chinese government capitalizes on the event since Chinese Foreign 
Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian had about 300,000 followers on Twitter when he propagandized 
the conspiracy theory. Ni (2015) pointed out that strategic disclosure of one-sided bias of issue 
would be a factor of manipulation that leads to the target audience’s conviction of illusive truth. 
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Chinese Coronavirus Propaganda Campaign   
Since President Trump took office in 2017, his diplomatic policy toward China focused on 
addressing U.S. trade deficits via tariffs and trade war rhetoric. The US-China relations deteriorated 
because of the unprecedented pandemic propaganda campaign launched by the Chinese government 
in response to Chinese President Xi’s cover-up and incompetence dealing with the domestic virus 
crisis. Targeting the United States was an effective strategy to distract the domestic criticism. The 
Lijian’s tweets for the propaganda campaign added fuel to the fire on the already bitter US-China 
relations. The Chinese-launched propaganda campaign was based on the practice of nationalism, 
aimed to blame Americans for the outbreak, while protecting Xi and his communist party from being 
criticized by their own people. A few days after the propaganda campaign was launched, thousands 
of new Chinese-bot accounts on Twitter, many the same as those attacking President Trump and the 
United States, were created “to ‘liking’ and ‘retweeting’ CCP propagandists, including on stories 
such as: ‘COVID-19: Further Evidence that the Virus Originated in the US” (Kassam, 2020, para. 
3). China sowed rabid doubt about the origin of the pandemic as a tactic of nationalism at the 
expense of US-China relations. Through the propaganda history of China, the nation is known to 
manufacture stories that describe itself as a victim of Western imperialism, especially of the United 
States supporting Taiwan and the Hong Kong protesters. 
Riegel (1938) argued that nationalism rises in times of national conflict and stress when 
“symbols of humanitarianism and internationalism rapidly lose their force and are supplanted by 
symbols of nationalistic self-preservation and self-defense” (p. 510). Although the concept and 
norms of nationalism were developed during World War I and II in relevance of military, dictatorship, 
and international security, the practice of nationalism in more recent years is associated with global 
economic warfare and national security against terrorism (McClintock, 2015). The case of the 
coronavirus pandemic of 2020 added a new factor of nationalism to the world, introducing that a 
global disease can lead to a sense of frustration and insecurity for human beings. A pandemic can 
promote the power of political state as a symbol of nationalism. China in the digital age has pushed 
its digital authoritarianism model as superior to liberal forms of government to suppress dissent and 
tighten Xi’s grip on power in the application of censorship and surveillance (“Chinese-style ‘digital 
authoritarianism’ grows,” 2018). Newspapers, television, and radio programs historically act as the 
main agencies for carrying out propaganda campaigns to promote nationalism in the middle of 
national and international crisis. China’s techno-dystopia to manipulate social media became a tool 
of authoritarian diplomacy used to deploy an army of electronic trolls that distributes propagandistic 
disinformation both inside and outside its borders (Zolfagharifard, 2018). 
Regarding China’s propaganda efforts aligned with the Chinese Communist Party and 
the Xi administration in the digital age, the Twitter-based propaganda campaign on the origin 
of coronavirus seemed inevitable for China to promote nationalism, in hopes that Xi and his 
communist party would emerge stronger than ever from the nation’s global crisis. The coronavirus 
propaganda campaign could enhance Chinese nationalism by bringing its people together with 
patriotic ideologies and emotional impacts, as opposed to influencing thoughts, feelings, and beliefs 
of American and global citizens about the origin of the virus. A few days after the official tweets 
were posted, millions of U.S. public received alarming messages on their cellphone screens and 
social media feeds, saying, President Trump planned to lock down the entire country (Wong et al., 
2020). The disinformation texts on cellphones were a new tactic that Chinese top officials pushed 
to “engage in a global disinformation campaign around the virus” and to “widen political divisions 
in the United States” since American public dissent was simmering over “lockdown policies in 
several states” (2020, para. 14-16). Such a propaganda campaign on a wide range of communication 
platforms enabled the Chinese government to reframe the coronavirus issues, create national 
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solidarity, and raise doubt about the origin. 
Two interesting results of the propaganda campaign should be mentioned for the bearing 
upon the effectiveness of social media as a medium to enable a fortification of Chinese nationalism, 
which grew alongside China’s ascendance on the world stage throughout the 2000s with periodic 
displays of economic and military power, and antagonistic foreign policies toward rival countries 
(Shen & Breslin, 2010). One result is disinformation as key to the propaganda campaign on social 
media to boost nationalism that promotes the Chinese government as a powerful nation-state. The 
other result of the propaganda campaign is a birth of theoretical model of S.C. nationalism inspired 
by U.S. President Trump.
 
Trump’s Advocacy of Nationalism and Strategic Communication War
As the United States was among the biggest victims of the coronavirus pandemic, the 
Lijian’s tweet triggered-propaganda campaign turned into a strategic communication war (S.C. war) 
of the US-China relations. In response to the Chinese propaganda campaign, the United State first 
turned to a public announcement by President Trump; he called the coronavirus the “Chinese virus” 
on his March 16 tweet (Trump, 2020). “China was putting out information, which was false, that our 
military gave this to them,” President Trump said during a press conference the next day. “Rather 
than have an argument, I said I have to call it where it came from, and it did come from China. So, 
I think it’s a very accurate term” (Trump, 2020).
Trump’s response to the Chinese propaganda campaign, renaming the coronavirus 
pandemic as “the Chinese virus,” initiated the coronavirus S.C. war that added a new aspect to the 
global rivalry of the Group of Two (G2). President Trump placed the pandemic spotlight on China 
with the Chinese virus rhetoric as Chinese President Xi and his party tried to obtain domestic and 
international support after receiving heavy criticism of earlier cover-ups of the virus. In other words, 
both presidents had to engage in the act of S.C. war to promote an anti-China vs. anti-America 
narrative. The coronavirus S.C. war originates from nationalism, embracing covert propagation of 
disinformation by Xi and overt propagation of reappropriation by Trump.  
President Trump declared himself a “nationalist,” touting the benefit of nationalism, which 
prioritizes the interests, values, and priority of a nation over all other nations’ interests and values 
(Cummings, 2018). His identification of self-nationalist parallels his political slogan of “Make 
America Great Again,” branding Trump’s nationalist image of “America first.” When asked by the 
chief White House correspondent for CNN, Jim Acosta, in 2018 if his nationalist character could be 
inferred as “coded language” or a “dog whistle” to the American public embracing a racist ideology, 
President Trump said the term “nationalism” has not “carried any racist connotation” (Cummings, 
2018, para. 7). Rather than viewing the term “nationalism” as the rhetorical symbol of racism, 
President Trump viewed it as a rhetorical expression of protectionism for American job security and 
national defense against foreign nations that inflict threats on the United States. President Trump’s 
Twitter post to label the coronavirus pandemic as the “Chinese virus” was derived from his nationalist 
character to rectify the disinformation of the origin by the Chinese government. His tweet branding 
the “Chinese virus” can be understood as an application of the dissent public relations technique 
to promote new thinking, facts and behavior toward American and global citizens in pursuit of 
increasing U.S. national interests (Moloney et al., 2013). In other words, the term “Chinses virus” in 
Trump’s nationalist view originated from his advocacy to protect the United States from the Chinese 
propaganda campaign. President Trump acted as an American spokesperson who advocates for his 
clientele, the American people, by referring to the coronavirus as the “Chinese virus” to confirm the 
origin of the pandemic. 
President Trump’ strenuous advocacy of U.S. national interests and security with the 
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rhetoric of the “Chinese virus,” however, did not receive warm support from some members of 
the liberal American public and the majority of U.S. media resonating with the critics of Trump. 
They viewed Trump’s use of the term “Chinese virus” as xenophobia.  Merriam-Webster Dictionary 
defines “xenophobia” as “fear and hatred of strangers or foreigners or of anything that is strange 
or foreign” (2020). After many Americans, including celebrities, criticized Trump’s label of the 
“Chinese virus” as racism, ABC News White House correspondent Cecilia Vega brought up the 
term’s racism issue, questioning President Trump at a White House press conference on March 18, 
2020: “Why do you keep calling this the ‘Chinese virus?’” (CBS News, 2020). In response, President 
Trump said, “Because it comes from China. It’s not racist at all. It comes from China, that’s why. I 
want to be accurate.” In short, President Trump issued an oral press release, reconfirming where the 
virus was born. However, the media framed his rhetoric of “Chinese virus” as racism and accused 
him of being a racist. 
While confronting the coronavirus S.C. war against China, President Trump continued 
his battles with “the relentlessly reckless and destructive Trump-loathing media” in the middle of 
a literal national emergency (Murdock, 2020, para. 4). Many other main news outlets reported the 
Trump-Vega Q & A session, adding other sources who criticized Trump’s reference to the “Chinese 
virus.” For example, CBS News quoted an Asian-American doctor, tweeting, “I’ve been deathly 
afraid of this exact moment where Trump turns to racism and xenophobia and calls COVID-19 the 
“Chinese virus”” (Brito, 2020). NBC News referenced State Assembly member Yuh-Line Niou, 
who represents New York City’s Chinatown, as saying President Trump “was fueling the flames of 
racism with all of his comments” (Yam, 2020).
The technique of dissent public relations was used by President Trump who served as an 
advocate for nationalism to fight the coronavirus S.C. war and to grapple with the hostile U.S. media. 
It is worth noting that nationalism means protectionism for American job security and national 
defense against foreign nations in President Trump’s mind, and his rhetoric of the “Chinese virus” 
was to pinpoint the accurate place the virus originated first. In a similar historical vein, German 
measles, Spanish Flu, West Nile virus, and Ebola were named after the origins for those diseases. 
Although President Trump’s advocacy of nationalism for the coronavirus S.C. war meant well, his 
long-time rocky relationship with the U.S. media resulted in media personalities attacking him as a 
racist who tried to exacerbate xenophobia by using the term “Chinese virus”. After the high-ranking 
Chinese official floated the propagandistic idea that American soldiers had spread the coronavirus 
to the Chinese public, President Trump as a public relations practitioner for the United States 
and its public first responded to the Chinese propaganda campaign on Twitter and later at a press 
conference by issuing such statements, which emphasized the accurate origin of the coronavirus 
with the term “Chinese virus”. In response, liberal U.S. media framed Trump’s advocacy as an act 
of racism. President Trump’s uneasy relations with the Chinese government and the U.S. media took 
its toll on his nationalist ethos and advocacy of “American first” in the middle of the coronavirus 
pandemic. His advocacy for the United States was disliked by some American journalists who saw 
Trump’s rhetorical term of “Chinese virus” through a distrustful and hated spectrum, even when 
the World Health Organization announced on December 31, 2019 that “Wuhan Municipal Health 
Commission, China, reported a cluster of cases of pneumonia in Wuhan, Hubei Province. A novel 
coronavirus was eventually identified” (W.H.O., 2020, para. 1). 
Theoretical Model of Strategic Communication Nationalism
Departing from the combined epistemological framework of coronavirus pandemic, Chinese 
propaganda campaign, coronavirus S.C. war, and President Trump’s advocacy of nationalism, this 
article establishes a theoretical model of S.C. nationalism in the context of the diplomatic dissent 
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represented by two powerful entities: the United States and China. The theoretical model for this 
article is associated with the dissent public relations sphere of interactive knowledge in a new position 
of the epistemic account of interpretation. More important, this article from an epistemological 
perspective proposes and illustrates epistemic justification of S.C. nationalism with an underlying 
theoretical framework that finds a strict dichotomy between nationalism and racism preposterous. 
      When an organization or a nation faces a crisis, a crisis communication manager is expected to 
issue a statement based on fact and representation of the truth as a part of the crisis communication 
strategy (Coombs, 2018). The manager is an advocate who speaks or acts in support of the 
organization or nation in alignment with reality. If the advocate is the king or president of the 
nation, he has the privilege of advocating for national clients – the public. He releases information 
and messages using a bully pulpit to the media and makes social media posts. In other words, his 
advocacy for the nation can be conceptualized as S.C. nationalism that aims to protect the public, 
maintain national security, and enhance national reputation in a strategic communication process of 
building a mutual relationship between the nation and national and global publics. To articulate the 
conceptual process of S.C. nationalism, this article presents Figure 1, illustrating a theoretical model 
of S.C. nationalism.
Figure 1 
Conceptualization of S.C. Nationalism Model   
This S.C. nationalism model is guided by the phenomena of coronavirus pandemic and 
Chinese propaganda campaign, which triggered President Trump’s fervent responses based on the 
dissent public relations technique in crisis communication. The tenets of Trump’s “America First” 
ethos and China’s nationalist agenda of influencing African, Hong Kong, Taiwan and the South 
China Sea provided this article with the theoretical model of S.C. nationalism in a diplomatic sense. 
In attempting to bridge the concepts between nationalism and dissent public relations in the specific 
global crisis, this article outlines a theoretical framework for conceptualizing the key dimensions of 
advocacy of strategic communication via geopolitical–relational nationalism.
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Pamment (2020) suggested that strategic communication among many different definitions 
and industrial practices serves as proactive campaigns for political advocacy and diplomacy on a 
diplomatic level. In other words, strategic communication with the goal of political advocacy to 
launch attacks on foreign nations can result in manufacturing disinformation and disseminating 
manipulative messages in the diplomatic communication sphere through PSYOP and propaganda. 
Strategic communication for diplomatic goals of defending national interest between governments 
has not varied greatly since Nazi propaganda and Soviet PSYOP was used for the maintenance 
and expansion of regimes.  However, the S.C. war of the “Chinese virus” demonstrates that a new 
phenomenon of strategic communication on the diplomatic level gets more diverse and strategic with 
the 24/7 news cycle and unlimited access to social media platforms, still including the traditional 
propaganda and PSYOP paradigms. Therefore, the S.C. nationalism model in this article embracing 
all players of strategic communication illustrates the new phenomenon of strategic communication. 
Conclusion
President Trump has been regarded as one of the most controversial and unorthodox 
commanders-in-chief in American history. His unfiltered and straightforward communication style 
via Twitter and media conferences were slammed as unpresidential. His rhetorical labeling of the 
“Chinese virus” was also scrutinized by the media and dubbed as racist. However, the Chinese 
circulation of disinformation about the origin of the coronavirus was an apparent propaganda 
campaign in the digital age, and President Trump was obligated to counteract it, not as a racist, but 
an advocate for nationalism amid the coronavirus S.C. war. The term “Chinese virus” first used in 
Trump’s tweet resonates with most American citizens’ unfavorable feelings about China, in which 
66% of them had a hostile view of the Chinese government amid the pandemic (Lee, 2020). More 
important, a European Union’s internal report on April 20, 2020 justified President Trump’s effort to 
protect the United State from China’s coronavirus propaganda campaign. “China has continued to 
run a global disinformation campaign to deflect blame for the outbreak of the pandemic and improve 
its international image. Both overt and covert tactics have been observed” (Satter et al., 2020, para. 
8).
The coronavirus S.C. war demonstrated the effectiveness of Twitter allowing users to post 
short messages that can be shared and reprinted countlessly. Such tweets by the Chinese official and 
President Trump about the origin of the coronavirus led the strategic communication community 
to engage in an effort to make a comprehensive approach to the traditional and new S.C. studies. 
Traditional strategic communication methods, such as propaganda, PSYOP, diplomacy, nationalism, 
and media bias, are now joined by new methods such as rhetorical reappropriation, use of social 
media, and control of narratives toward global audiences. In sum, it is hoped that this article lays 
the foundation for understanding and developing further principles and functions of strategic 
communication as political advocacy of nationalism on a diplomatic level with the emerging use of 
social media.
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